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Abstract
A review of the evidence shows that bundled payments for surgical procedures can generate savings without
adversely affecting patient outcomes. Less is known about the effect of bundled payments for chronic medical
conditions, but early evidence suggests that cost and quality improvements may be small or non-existent.
There is little evidence that bundles reduce access and equity, but continued monitoring is required.
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INTRODUCTION
Paying physicians and health institutions using bundled payments has 
become increasingly popular since the passage of comprehensive 
health reform in 2010. Once limited to small pilot projects between 
individual payers and health systems, bundled payments have now 
become a central strategy for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) to increase quality while controlling health care costs. 
Bundled payment initiatives now include dozens of medical conditions 
and procedures in over 1,000 institutions in the U.S., covering hundreds 
of thousands of episodes of care annually. In this brief, we review how 
bundled payments have changed the cost and quality of care, as well as 
whether they have had any unintended impact on access and equity.
BACKGROUND
THE LANDSCAPE OF BUNDLED PAYMENTS 
Bundled payments are one of a series of reforms designed to move 
providers away from fragmented fee-for-service (FFS) structures toward 
payment models that shift financial risk for both total cost of care and 
quality on to providers. Under bundled payments, providers are responsible 
for the total cost of a pre-determined episode of care, including costs 
of labor, medical devices (e.g. implants), complications, post-acute care, 
and readmissions. Care episodes can include surgical procedures, such 
as coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG), or medical conditions, such 
as acute myocardial infarction (AMI). If providers keep costs below a risk-
adjusted target price, they receive a portion of the shared savings; if they 
exceed the target price, they incur financial penalties. 
Although commercial payers also use bundles, most studies have evaluated 
bundled payment programs in Medicare. A brief description of the 
largest programs appears in Table 1. While CMS can mandate bundles on 
providers, most participation is voluntary. As shown, the scale and target 
conditions vary across bundles. 
After small demonstration projects with cardiac and orthopedic procedures,1 
in 2013 CMS launched its largest national bundled payment program, the 
Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) initiative. Although 
BPCI has four models, we focus here on Model 2, which is the largest 
program and the basis for commercial bundles.  
BPCI Model 2 covers all Medicare charges for both hospitalizations 
and post-acute care (PAC), which includes acute inpatient care (i.e., 
readmissions), office or other (e.g. physical therapy) visits, outpatient facility 
care, or durable medical equipment. BPCI participants select the surgical 
procedures or medical conditions to bundle. Hip and knee replacements 
are the most commonly selected surgical procedures, and congestive heart 
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failure (CHF) is the most popular medical condition. Medicare continues 
to pay on a FFS basis, but the cost is reconciled after the episode closes. 
Currently, more than 400 providers participate in BPCI Model 2.2 
Medicare’s Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) model is 
a mandatory program for hip and knee replacements. Like BPCI, hospitals 
in CJR are responsible for all Medicare spending for inpatient and 90 
days post-discharge. Providers are still paid on a FFS basis, but differences 
between target prices and incurred costs are reconciled at the end of the 
year. While individual hospitals volunteer to participate in BPCI, CJR 
participation occurs at the market level. CJR is currently underway in 67 
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), many of which CMS picked because 
they are high-spending regions. For the first two years (2016-2017), about 
800 hospitals were required to participate. CMS shrunk the program in 
2018, mandating participation in 34 MSAs and including 465 hospitals.3 
The recently launched BPCI Advanced extends bundled payments to 
the outpatient setting. In addition to covering 29 inpatient episodes, BPCI 
Advanced includes three outpatient episodes, such as percutaneous 
coronary intervention (PCI), also known as angioplasty with stent. 
Participation in BPCI Advanced will count as an advanced payment 
model under the new Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act 
(MACRA), which entitles providers to a 5% bonus Medicare payment and 
exempts providers from several reporting requirements.4
BUNDLED PAYMENTS, COST, AND QUALITY
The most pressing concern regarding bundled payments is whether or 
not they reduce the cost of care while preserving or improving patient 
outcomes. Do bundled payments reduce the average per-episode cost, 
and if so, how are hospitals achieving these savings? 
COSTS AND QUALITY FOR SURGICAL PROCEDURES: BPCI  
Dummit and colleagues (2016) used Medicare claims data and patient 
surveys to study how BPCI participation influenced cost and quality 
for hip and knee replacements. They found that BCPI hospitals 
achieved average per-episode savings of $1,166 (4%) over similar non-
participating hospitals. The largest savings were in post-acute care, 
particularly skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) and inpatient rehabilitation 
facilities (IRFs). They found no differences in 30- and 90-day mortality 
and readmissions rates between BPCI and non-BPCI hospitals. Patient-
reported outcomes (e.g. satisfaction, improvement in activities, and 
pain) remained either unchanged or modestly improved in the BPCI 
group.6  
In a study of a 5-hospital integrated system, Navathe and colleagues 
(2017) demonstrated the ability for bundled payments to lead to 
even larger savings at top performing hospitals and provided more 
detail on how hospitals responded to bundled payments for hip and 
knee replacements. They found that average per-episode payments 
decreased by 21% from 2008 to 2015, with statistically significant 
decreases only during BPCI participation. In line with Dummit’s findings, 
the study found no effect on readmissions or emergency department 
visits. 
How did the hospital system achieve these savings? Using the health 
system’s internal cost data, the authors found that PAC accounted 
for 49% of savings, with 51% achieved through reductions in internal 
hospital costs (implants, blood supply, and room and board). 
Reductions of internal hospital costs did not result in savings to 
Medicare, which pays these expenses on a prospective system. The 
finding is striking because hospitals already have an incentive to reduce 
Table 1. Overview of Bundles 
Program 
Start  
Year
Number of  
Participants
Outpatient and/or 
inpatient trigger
Services  
Covered 
Conditions and  
Procedures
BPCI Model 2 
(Voluntary)2 
2013 253 hospitals and 
152 physician group 
practices
Inpatient Inpatient hospital and physician 
services, PAC, readmissions
48 clinical episodes (e.g. AMI, 
hip/knee replacements, CABG)
CJR 
(Mandatory)3
2015 67 MSAs* Inpatient Inpatient and outpatient hospital and 
physician services, PAC, readmissions
Hip/knee replacements
Oncology 
Care Model 
(Voluntary)5
2016 178 practices, 13 payers Outpatient All Medicare Parts A, B, and certain 
Part D expenditures
Cancers not treated with 
surgery, radiation, or topical 
chemotherapy
BPCI 
Advanced 
(Voluntary)4 
2018 TBD Both Inpatient and outpatient hospital and 
physician services, PAC, readmissions
29 inpatient clinical episodes 
(e.g. AMI) and three outpatient 
clinical episodes (e.g. PCI)
* Reduced to 34 mandated MSAs in 2018, though hospitals in the remaining 33 MSAs may volunteer to continue participation.
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internal costs under the prospective system, which suggests that the 
financial incentives under BPCI (i.e. gainsharing) were especially 
powerful in motivating surgeons to standardize implant use and hospital 
costs through alignment with the hospital.7 
Liao and colleagues (2018) explored whether bundled payments 
reduced the variation in practice from 2009 to 2015 among 34 surgeons 
in the same 5-hospital system. The study found modest (though not 
statistically significant) decreases in variation in implant cost per case 
and institutional PAC use, while variation across surgeons in total 
episode payment increased. The findings suggest that while reduction 
in practice variation can occur under bundles, it is not absolutely 
necessary to achieve savings. 
Zhu and colleagues (2018) added perspective on how hospitals reacted 
to bundled payments and achieved PAC savings. In a series of semi-
structured interviews with hospital executives, the authors found that 
the primary hospital strategies for succeeding under bundle payments 
included reducing SNF referrals, leveraging home care supports, and 
enhancing coordination with pre-determined networks of SNFs—such 
as electronic health record integration and hiring care coordinators.8 
COST AND QUALITY FOR SURGICAL PROCEDURES: CJR 
Because CJR is relatively new, its effect on cost, quality, and access 
is less understood. In an analysis of CJR’s first year, Finkelstein and 
colleagues (2018) found that the average percentage of hip and knee 
replacement admissions discharged to institutional PAC was 33.7% 
in non-CJR hospitals and 30.8% among CJR hospitals. The overall 
reduction in per-episode spending was much more modest than 
observed in BPCI. Total Medicare spending was $453 lower at CJR 
hospitals before accounting for shared savings distributions, which 
eliminated the difference.9 
Navathe and colleagues (2018) compared hospitals that achieved 
savings with hospitals that did not under CJR. Just under half (48%) 
of hospitals produced savings. In each market, the average savings per 
episode ranged from $14 to $3,591, and the proportion of hospitals 
saving money in a given market ranged from 0% to 100%.10 
Compared to non-saving hospitals, hospitals that reduced average 
cost were larger, had a higher volume of procedures, were more likely 
to be non-profit or teaching hospitals, and were also more likely to be 
integrated with PAC facilities. Further, hospitals achieving savings did 
not start with higher baseline episode spending, debunking a belief 
previously held by some experts.
COST AND QUALITY FOR MEDICAL CONDITIONS 
Less is known about the effect of bundled payments on chronic 
medical conditions, but early evidence suggests that cost and quality 
improvements may be small or non-existent. Maddox and colleagues 
(2018) used Medicare claims data from 2013 to 2015 to assess cost and 
quality for five commonly selected BPCI conditions—congestive heart 
failure, pneumonia, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), 
sepsis, and acute myocardial infarction—over an average of 7 months 
of BPCI participation. Average per-episode spending across all five 
conditions decreased in BPCI and non-BPCI hospitals by $286 and 
$398, respectively, but the differential decrease was not statistically 
significant. There were no observed differences in readmission rates, 
mortality, or other quality measures.11 
Why might bundled payments have different effects for procedures 
and medical conditions? It could be a timing issue: while hospitalizations 
are an excellent trigger for surgical bundles, inpatient admissions do not 
always indicate the beginning of a medical condition. It also could take 
more time to redesign care for medical conditions, or be due to factors 
involving PAC. For example, while PAC spending can be standardized 
and yield savings more easily for surgical conditions, medical conditions 
have more cyclical spending patterns between inpatient and PAC 
services. Moreover, the types of services provided in PAC settings 
differ substantially between surgical procedures and medical conditions; 
reducing PAC utilization without negatively affecting quality may be 
more difficult when treating medical conditions than after surgical 
procedures.12 
Figure 1. Distribution of Savings in CJR
Navathe AS, Liao JM, Shah Y, et al. Characteristics of Hospitals Earning Savings in 
the First Year of Mandatory Bundled Payment for Hip and Knee Surgery. JAMA. 
2018;319(9):930-932.
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BUNDLED PAYMENTS AND  
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
DO HOSPITALS PERFORM MORE PROCEDURES? 
In the case of bundles, one prominent concern is that while average 
per-episode spending may decrease, episode-based payments could 
drive greater volume that, in turn, offsets savings to Medicare. Episodic 
Medicare savings could be eliminated if hospitals perform more hip and 
knee replacements than they otherwise would have,13 and early studies of 
BPCI found modest increases in procedure volume.7 
However, volume increases may not necessarily be an undesired 
outcome. If bundled payments raise quality (e.g., reduce complications), 
then the value of joint replacement may improve, increasing the number 
of patients who could benefit from the procedure. If providers shift 
patients from non-BPCI facilities to BPCI facilities, it would increase 
market share for BPCI participants without changing overall procedural 
volume. In both cases, more volume would be a sign of success rather 
than an unintended consequence.14 
Navathe and colleagues (2018) evaluated hip and knee replacement 
volume at the market level under BPCI. They found volume increases 
in both BPCI and non-BPCI markets between 2011 and 2015, but no 
significant differences due to BPCI participation. The results suggest that 
increased volume at BPCI hospitals is likely a result of growing market 
share, not overall volume spikes.15 
DO HOSPITALS AVOID HIGHER-RISK PATIENTS? 
Because bundled payments tie provider compensation to quality 
outcomes and overall spending, there is a concern that providers may 
improve their performance measures by avoiding high-risk patients. Such 
risk-selection could reduce access to care based on health, demographic, 
and socioeconomic factors. While early studies of bundled payments 
for surgical procedures found no evidence of patient selection, and 
target prices are adjusted partly based on patient risk, hospitals have 
informational advantages over Medicare that may allow discrimination. 
To study the effect of BPCI participation on patient selection for hip and 
knee replacements, Navathe and colleagues (2018) compared 20 patient 
characteristics, including comorbidities, demographics, socioeconomics, 
and prior utilization, at 265 matched BPCI and non-BPCI hospitals. 
The authors largely found no significant differences across any relevant 
case-mix measures, which suggests that bundled payments did not 
significantly affect health disparities.15 However, patients at BPCI hospitals 
were less likely to have been admitted to a SNF in the prior 12 months, 
leading to a concern that hospitals may be avoiding patients with a 
history of institutional care. On the other hand, it may be the case that 
SNF admission is associated with other clinical factors that make joint 
replacement a less effective option for such patients. The appropriateness 
of this change was not assessed in their study. 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HOSPITALS  
IN BPCI AND CJR
THE NEED FOR BOTH 
Going forward, there is a question of whether future bundled payments 
have to be mandatory. If hospitals that choose to participate differ 
from those that must participate, then both voluntary and mandatory 
bundles are needed to engage providers. But if voluntary and mandatory 
participants are similar, then mandatory bundles may be unnecessary. 
Navathe and colleagues (2018) analyzed data from Medicare and the 
American Hospital Association to compare characteristics and baseline 
performance between BPCI and CJR hospitals. The study found that 
CJR and BPCI hospitals were similar in terms of baseline cost and 
quality, but they differed in other characteristics: BPCI hospitals were 
more likely to be non-profit and teaching intensive than CJR hospitals. 
BPCI hospitals were larger and had higher patient volume. The findings 
suggest that both mandatory and voluntary programs may be required to 
engage a broad cross-section of hospitals and markets, and results in one 
payment model may not be applicable to other programs.16 Furthermore, 
the 67 markets currently in CJR are not representative of the rest of the 
nation—as demonstrated by Liao and colleagues in a forthcoming study.17
Figure 2.  Volume of Hip and Knee Replacement Under  
Bundled Payments
Navathe AS, Liao JM, Dykstra SE, et al. Association of Hospital Participation in a 
Medicare Bundled Payment Program With Volume and Case Mix of Lower Extremity 
Joint Replacement Episodes. JAMA. 2018;320(9):901-910.
CONCLUSION
THE FUTURE OF EPISODE-BASED PAYMENT
The evidence to date suggests that bundled payments yield favorable results for surgical conditions 
such as hip and knee replacement, which have predictable cycles of spending and defined quality 
metrics. However, bundled payments for medical conditions have yet to achieve savings or improve 
quality. While the potential unintended consequences of bundles have not yet been observed, 
researchers will continue to monitor bundled payment implementation going forward. 
Another round of bundled payment evaluation is on the horizon as well. The recently launched 
BPCI Advanced program will provide a wealth of new data as Medicare and commercial insurers 
use bundles for more procedures, conditions, and settings—including outpatient clinics. As the 
program develops, researchers will begin to assess how episodic payments can bring high value 
care to a greater number of patients and provide iterative feedback on model design. 
As policymakers and payers consider the next generation of bundled payment models, aligning 
design with intended outcomes and other payment models may be the key to maximizing 
value. The diversity of bundled payment programs and evidence to date reveal that the path to 
high value care via episode-base payment requires constant innovation and evaluation. As the 
widespread cultural shift from volume to value in health care accelerates, bundled payments will 
only grow in relevance. 
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